The United Nations, the United States, the Afghan government, and many other countries and entities have been very busy right now in making, or paving way for, a reconciliation plan with the Taliban that is likely to be announced at an important international forum: the London conference for Afghanistan, on Thursday, Jan. 28.
For his part, the U.N. special representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, ‘towards a first step to opening direct negotiations with the insurgent group, sought the removal of at least some senior Taliban leaders from the United Nations’ list of terrorists,’ The New York Times reported on Jan. 24. (The U.N. has now removed names of five former Taliban officials from the blacklist).
The next day, BBC reported that the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, ‘told Financial Times newspaper that there had been “enough fighting.”’ And that ‘political solution in all conflicts was “inevitable.”’
Inevitably, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan had to outline a strategy for this whole reconciliation and reintegration plan. On Jan. 17, his spokesman, Waheed Omar, told a news conference that followers of the Taliban who defect will be offered jobs and security. Later, President Karzai himself provided more explanation and said: ‘Through a national reconciliation strategy, we want to absorb the Taliban fighters who don’t have links with Al Qaeda network and other terrorist groups.’
The response from the opposite side was clear: The Taliban militants launched a brazen attack on central Kabul, very close to the Palace where President Karzai was busy in preparing his reconciliation plan. The day-long standoff came to an end after three security men and two civilians were killed and 71 more injured. The attack was not very important in terms of casualties, but had much bitter impacts in terms of creating chaos and challenging the huge presence of the international and Afghan forces in a heavily fortified central part of the city.
Contrary to that, the response from a former jihadi warlord and currently wanted terrorist leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was softer and inviting. Instead of launching an armed attack, he released a taped statement in which, according to the Wall Street Journal, he outlined a roadmap for political reconciliation. President Karzai has included one of Hekmatyar’s former party members, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, in his new cabinet which may help the two to come close.
As the past 8 years’ war proved that fighting only brings more destruction and frustration, and in the particular case of Afghanistan it only helped the insurgents to grow and expand, the entire world is now suggesting for the peace talks with the insurgents. But a huge problem still remains at place: the lack of trust among the involved parties. Though the United States, Pakistan and Iran are the main partners of the conflict, Saudi Arabia, China, India and many other countries may also have their shares. And for now, it is clear that the United States is not going to trust on Pakistan, while Pakistan will never trust on Afghanistan and India. The same is true between Iran and the United States, between Pakistan and Iran, between India and China, and the rest.
The Taliban have their own reservations about this plan. Their utmost demand is the withdrawal of the international troops, while the international community is offering reconciliation amid sending more troops. Ostensibly the strategy is aimed to weaken the Taliban by deploying the additional troops and at the same time offering them an opportunity to reconcile with the Afghan government. That may work for people who are fighting for financial incentives but not for ideologically motivated core elements and the ones that are trained and supported from outside Afghanistan. There is a strong possibility that the Taliban who defect for money may switch sides back as soon as the international forces are out of the country or they think the Taliban are stronger again.
Taking this into consideration, many Afghans believe that this plan, and even this conference, is just another talk show that will not bring any change and will have not any new impacts on their lives and the situation in general in Afghanistan. Haji Naqeebullah Muhabbat Khan, a former jihadi commander and a tribal elder in eastern Afghan province, when asked about the moot, said:
‘During the last few years, several conferences were held for development of Afghanistan and huge amounts of money were pledged but most of it went back to the pockets of foreigners.’
This is a general concern about the money that comes to Afghanistan and much of it is taken back by the people who bring it. The sub-contracting system has made the construction work very complicated and the NGO business has underlined the government bitterly. This has now resulted into uncontrollable corruption in the government as well as the private sector. For Afghans, corruption is now a problem bigger and more dangerous than the insurgency.
For better and effective results, the international community, particularly the United States, has to make a realistic and long-term strategy that can work in the regional context. For that, the Afghan government needs to be fully supported and given more authority and independence in decision-making, especially when it comes to crucial issues like reconciliation, spending the aid money, and making security plans. The international community needs to work more with the neighboring countries that are part of the problem to pressurize them to adopt a positive approach towards the solution of the conflict and stop dreaming of conquering Afghanistan after the international forces leave.

For the last three or four days, I have been asked a question nearly a hundred times: ‘what are the election results?’ From my neighbors next door to the taxi drivers, colleagues and local and foreign journalists, everyone is impatient to know the outcome of the much-discussed, controversial Afghan elections that were held on August 20, but two months passed and no one has a clue about the real situation. One day it seems that a runoff will be the result but the next day there is a strong possibility that President Hamid Karzai is going to be declared as the winner. On the third day it appears there is a possibility for ‘negotiations’ and a ‘coalition government.’

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The U.N. and the U.S. wasted no time in declaring the election a success. True that the violence during the election process was not of much significance, in terms of its inability to hinder the process completely, but the fear that the Taliban were able to instill into the hearts of the voters before election day resulted in a low turnout across the country; even lower than expected in southern and southeastern provinces where the insurgents have control over several districts. They had threatened to cut off fingers found with the voting ink on.

According to latest reports, the vote count has been completed, the official results are yet not out, but both President Hamid Karzai and his rival Dr. Abdullah Abdullah claimed victory over one another last night. Other candidates blamed officials for rigging on a massive scale. Of course, irregularities, flaws in the process and other problems were reported from all over the country.

The country as well as the world is now impatiently waiting for the results to know who the winner was. Unofficial results and surveys show Mr. Karzai and Abdullah neck-and-neck in some provinces and Mr. Karzai much ahead in others. Two strong possibilities emerge as a result: a runoff if none of the candidates had the required votes; and a tension if one candidate got the majority votes and the other refused to accept his victory; this is the case most likely if President Karzai was declared a winner.

This is a very complicated situation now. By now it is clear that the winner is either Karzai or Abdullah. If the official announcement of the results provokes the failed one of them and it incites violence or stirs up tension which will eventually end up as a conflict between the Pashtoons and the Tajiks, or between the South and the North, it will divide the country and will harm the efforts against terrorism immensely, not only in Afghanistan, but in the whole region.

In the north, the notorious warlord, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, has backed President Karzai in the election, while a powerful Governor of the Balkh province, Ustad Atta Mohammad Noor, campaigned for Dr. Abdullah. A tension on the election results may provoke Gen. Dostum and his Uzbek militia to act violently. He is already unhappy with the U.S. embassy statements about his return from Turkey. But in general view, his return contributed to the perception that the election was contested on the ground of warlordism, not democratic manners. This increased some people’s contempt towards the election process in Afghanistan.

With these uncertainties prevailing in the election aftermath, the international community, particularly the U.N. and the U.S., need to recognize the need of a broad based strategy that is acceptable to both sides and, more importantly, workable and effective in situations of this nature. This step is particularly important because if a conflict arises from this tension, it will have very unsuccessful and disastrous results for a ‘successful’ election.

 Both the commanding powers of the eight-year old War on Terror, the United States and the United Kingdom, recently hinted for talks with the Taliban insurgents after the second presidential election of the country, set for August 20.

 According to Daily Mail, “the suggestion of ‘talks with the Taliban’ came as Gordon Brown revealed the biggest offensive by UK troops in Helmand Province since the conflict began is now over. Ministers said that talking with the insurgents who have killed 191 British soldiers might be the only way to curtail the bloody war.”

 Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed and praised this approach, saying: “starting peace process with the Taliban will ensure peace and stability and such efforts are part of our government’s strategy,” said a statement issued from his spokesman’s office on Tuesday, July 28, 2009.

 Like the Britons, the Americans too seem in need of talks with the Taliban as their soldiers suffered record casualties in the month of July. According to Pajhwok Afghan News, while talking to Afghanistan Ulema Council (AUC) in Kabul on July 25, “US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke promised beginning peace talks with the Taliban and other opposition forces once the upcoming presidential and provincial elections are completed.”

 But the basic question is still unanswered, even not discussed: How are you going to talk with them? Have you developed any strategy for this? The insurgents have always refused to participate in talks and meetings that suggest reconciliation. Withdrawal of the international troops from Afghanistan is their first and foremost demand. For the international troops it is unlikely to accept this demand because it will be their defeat in this bloody war. It is as clear as crystal: the world’s most advanced armies and their governments just can’t afford to be defeated by a force of insurgents.

 For President Hamid Karzai, talks with the Taliban has always been a brilliant idea; but all of his negotiations offers were rejected by the Taliban leadership; the one-eyed insurgent leader has even called on the people to boycott the ‘deceptive election.’ Yet, Mr. Karzai has been using the talks offer as a slogan for his election campaign. During his last visit to Kanahar, he said that he will initiate peace talks with the Taliban if he was re-elected.  But why could not he do so during his eight years in the office? The answer is simple: because the Taliban wanted a complete withdrawal of the international troops and the international troops had an agenda of curbing the menace of terrorism.

 The idea of ‘moderate Taliban’ and reconciliation with them is also a blur perception: if someone is a moderate, they surely would not like to be a part of the ruthlessness that the insurgents have been demonstrating in different forms such as killing civilian people in suicide attacks, burning schools and hospitals and murdering aid workers, engineers, journalists, teachers and doctors. After reading this Newsweek article, one may consider even Mullah Baradar a ‘moderate,’ but, according to the article, it was he who re-organized the force in true meaning and still leads it from unknown places in Quetta.

 And then there is another question: if the international troops and the next Afghan government decide to talk with the insurgents, which group of the insurgents will they talk with? And does each of these groups has enough authority to come to the table of talks? When Pakistan balked at the recent Helmand operation, it was not just that the militants were fleeing to their land, but the real reason was Pakistan’s losing of its strategic assets.  It means that there are many external factors, such as Pakistan, who should be addressed before any talks with the Afghan forces of the insurgents. If the external factors were not addressed and the insurgents were brought to the table of talks, it will be just a waste of time and resources because these insurgents will get the huge share of the benefits of reconciliation while the external forces will still be free to recruit and train other fighters or groups of fighters who will then confront the international forces with a new strategy and different tactics of fighting to achieve their goals.

 The presidential election is now three weeks away. It is premature to say anything about the approaches of the would-be-president of Afghanistan to this issue, but after reading the views of most hopeful candidate, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, one can conclude that the talks option will not work unless the external factors are addressed. He states: “There are four major threats to securing Afghanistan’s futures. First, Al Qaeda is a renewed force moving fluidly between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Second, an expanded, well resourced, and multifaceted insurgency presents a continual threat to Afghan and international actors.” And for addressing these challenges, he writes: “To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban’s gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.”