Afghanistan has been a real victim of world powers’ short-term strategies that are often devised against their own earlier strategies. The newest strategy that the United States is working on is to bypass the central government in Afghanistan and directly support the Pashtun tribes to fight against the Taliban. According to a New York Times report, as a first step towards this end, the U.S. is going to support the Shinwari tribe in eastern Afghanistan. ‘In exchange for their [the tribesmen’s] support, American government agreed to channel $1 million in development projects directly to the tribal leaders and bypass the local Afghan government, which is widely seen as corrupt.’

For Afghans, this ‘corrupt government’ had full support of the entire international community for last eight years. A remarkable majority of the Afghans now question that if this government was so corrupt, why the U.S. and the international community let it run during all these years. Until now, everybody spoke about democracy, human rights, civil society, stabilizing the government, and capacity building. But suddenly, the track changed and now every prime minister, every president, every ambassador, every military commander, and every civilian expert speaks about reconciliation with the Taliban, bypassing the central government, and supporting the tribes. Now they see the solution in the centuries old corrupt and outdated tribal system that will now fight against the Taliban but eventually will turn into uncontrollable militias and then? the international community will undoubtedly devise another strategy to get rid of them.

It is true that this tribal system worked 30-40 years ago, but its authority and function was undermined by a same strategy that was also devised by the U.S. and Pakistan in which a new generation of the Afghan youths was encouraged to follow the jihadi leaders, well-trained and well-paid by the U.S., instead of the tribal elders. According to another New York Times report, at that time, ‘the United States, backed by the Saudi and Pakistani governments, unleashed its own assault on Afghanistan’s tribes. American-backed Wahhabi fundamentalism created hundreds of thousands of young mujahedeen (holy warriors) to attack Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Religiously indoctrinated and flush with American cash, these young Afghan fighters viewed Muslim clerics and mujahedeen commanders – not tribal elders – as their true leaders.’

Eventually the Soviet troops withdrew, but the tribal elders and system continued to suffer as the country descended into a new era of warlordism that annihilated every value of the Afghan society. The Taliban emerged as a result of that warlordism but further expanded the fight against tribal values. More recently, hundreds of tribal elders in the tribal areas as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan were murdered in a series of target killings because they were believed to be supporters of the governments. Particularly in the tribal areas, many tribal jirgas and gatherings were targeted by suicide attacks in recent months.

The New York Times report correctly said that: ‘Some Afghans warn that the tribal system is not a panacea and fear that the United States is adopting a quick-fix approach that will not create long-term stability. They see the tribes inherently anachronistic, sexist and corrupt – a system that further undermines the already extraordinarily difficult task of creating multi-ethnic, merit-based institutions. They warn that the country would be thrown into the hands of myriad tribal militias that the central government could never control.’

So, instead of short-term and quick-fix strategies that create more problems in the long run, there should be a long-time commitment for stabilizing the government, promoting democratic values, human rights and civil society, reducing poverty, and working for capacity building in Afghanistan. That is the only way to a long-time solution in this war-torn country.

For a long time, the Afghans have been the victims of policies, ideologies and strategies imported and enforced from outside the country. An internal Afghan solution has never been a priority for the international players of the Afghan conflict. The new Obama strategy, which has two main parts: sending more 30,000 troops to gain the momentum against the terrorists, and invest huge amounts to lure the Taliban fighters to switch sides, is another part of this series.

This strategy is for the next 18 months. The key question is: what will happen after that? The Taliban is not a pure Afghan dilemma. It has local and international powers behind it as supporters. If these supporters continue to support and pay for fighting, the insurgency will never see an end. They will pay to make them fighters and you will pay to switch sides. At the end of the day, Obama, or the next US President, will have to draw another new strategy. Thus, the conflict will continue until the time the basic regional problems and issues are understood and resolved, not through foreign strategies but through local mechanisms.

As an effort to provide a further explanation of the basic problem, for example, we can discuss the role Pakistan does play in the regional conflicts and politics. This nuclear-armed country is seen as the major contributor to the international terrorism and extremism and at the same time a major front to fight against the global threat of terrorism. From the events that have been taking place within this country, we can tell that Pakistan is extremely confused over the issue of fighting against terrorism. Two days back (on Dec. 12, 2009), Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani told reporters in Lahore that the anti-terror operation in South Waziristan was over. This he said after having claimed that the military had cleared the area of local and foreign terrorists and was now in its control. But the next day, while speaking to a different audience in Karachi, he changed his statement and said that the operation was not over but will continue to an indefinite time. This created confusion and suspicion about the coordination between the political officials and the military commanders.

Similarly, there are reports that the country is widely divided on the issue of anti-terror operations. According to these reports, the powerful military, the intelligence agencies, the political-religious parties that were originally created and later supported by the establishment, are against the operations and support the extremist groups for their local as well as international agendas, while the weak political government and the liberal circles want an all-out campaign to be launched against the terror groups that are hiding and operating in the tribal areas as well as the settled and urban areas.

The reasons behind the fact that a majority of Pakistan’s military, political, and religious elements support terrorism or extremism are not very much complicated: Pakistan has a 62-year long enmity with India and its military gets benefited from this conflict. And the use of terrorist groups has proved the most effective and lethal method against India. So, unless the Pak-India conflict is solved, the military will never want to put a complete end to the terror groups. The second reason: Pakistan is not happy with the US presence in the region because that has been harming its strategic role in Afghanistan. As troubling as the Pak-India conflict is the Durand Line issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This conflict has deep political dimensions. A remarkable majority of the Afghans believe that Pakistan has illegally occupied the Pashtun-dominated areas. They think that the Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan should be a part of Afghanistan or turned into an independent state, known as Pashtunistan. Pakistan’s political powers are aware of these perceptions and know that a stable and peaceful Afghanistan may mean a re-emerge of the Pashtunistan issue. So without resolving this crucial issue, Pakistan’s political powers may never want to stop supporting the Afghan insurgency.

So reconciliation with the insurgents is okay. But there is still a strong need to look at these issues as important factors because only the solution of these problems can bring a long-lasting peace and stability to the region.

 The Pakistani government in the restive northwest province on Sunday arrested Maulana Sufi Mohammad, father-in-law of Mullah Fazlullah, the militant leader in Swat, and head of Tanzim-e-Nifaz-e-Sharia-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).

 “He killed a lot of people. Again he was planning for this. We will not allow anyone to destroy peace at Malakand and Swat,” said Mian Iftekhar Hussain, Information Minister of the province, as quoted by AFP.

 Interestingly, Mr. Hussain is a part of the same government which freed the Maulana in February 2008 and allowed him to go home comfortably. He then brokered a peace deal between his son-in-law and the government. The government then did not consider the fact that he had ‘killed a lot of people.’ How a peace deal can work when it is brokered by a killer? The government ignored this question, the Swat peace deal did never work, and it had to arrest him again.

 It is not just one example of the game that the government of Pakistan, its army and its secret agencies have been playing in the region: it places the blame of the assassination of the country’s most popular leader and two-time Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, on Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud and wants to kill or capture him, yet it failed to provide protection to a tribal commander, Qari Zainuddin, who rebelled against his network. Similarly, the government is fighting against the militants in many parts of the tribal and settled areas, yet it failed to support the tribal lashkars (armies) that wanted to wipe out the militants from their areas. This is enough evidence of the actual fact: Pakistan wants neither to win nor lose this game.

 As most of the Pakistanis thought the militants as their ‘strategic assets’ because their government was fully supporting them in their campaign against Afghanistan, their uprising against the Pakistani government and people has still not changed the minds and interests of some powerful elements within the government and the army. These elements are the key stakeholders of the power and they want to continue the war against terrorism in just a confusing and complicated way in order to keep both the international community and the insurgents engaged in the region. These elements need the international community for huge aids and the insurgents to use against India. The result: they can neither win nor lose this war.