Abdulhadi Hairan - Afghan writer, research analyst, journalist, and translator

Posts Tagged ‘Election 2009’

Afghanistan, Election 2009

August 19, 2009

An election under fear both for good and for bad reasons approaches

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 It was Afghanistan’s 90th Independence Day today, the first that no one celebrated due to the complicated nature of the country’s second-ever landmark election, just hours away now. The Taliban-launched terror campaign forced the people to stay at homes and the security forces to take stricter measures for protection and safety. Even the Nato-led international peacekeeping force halted its offensive operations to protect voters around polling centers.

 Reports from different parts of the country say the election process is under attack everywhere in many shapes: attacks on polling centers, attacks on candidates, and threats to the voters. As a last attempt to change the situation in their favor, the Taliban claimed to have sent 20 suicide bombers and attackers to Kabul while the government asked media organizations to limit their reporting of violent acts of terror. It is true that the media coverage of terror acts encourages the perpetrators of violence and promotes their ambitions.

Finally, the election day arrived but amid two kinds of fear for the voters: there are voters who will be forced away from polling by the Taliban and their allies (bad fear), yet the voters who will manage to poll will still have fears about the fairness and transparency of the process (good fear). The former is related to the Afghan situation (and was experienced during Pakistan’s last election) while the latter is customary in the regional brand democracies, often based and practiced on dictatorial tendencies, conspiracy and rigging as well as different sorts of lies falsely justified by religious and political pretexts.

 Though this is the second presidential election in the country’s short democratic history, it is a real test for all the parties involved in the situation: the international community; the Afghan government; the Afghan people; and the insurgents.

 For the international community and the United States President Barack Obama, the success, or failure, of a new important strategy for the region depends on the capabilities of a new elected administration in Afghanistan.

 For the Afghan government, the test is important in many aspects: For example, how it maintains the election process, how it reacts to the people’s decision, and how it copes with or manages the situation after the polling is done and the result is out.

 For the Afghan people, it is really an experiment and a historic experience. It is they who will decide and choose the new leader, and the world is impatient to see how they will bear it if the result was not what they have been expecting (many fear for an Iran-like situation).

 And for the insurgents, this is the opportunity to show how much their strength and presence can affect or change the situation. In their case, it will shape the approach about them after the election in terms of negotiations with them or operations against them. In this context, we can say that this election is not just an event, but a series of important events full of suspense.

 Tomorrow I will visit many polling centers and will what I saw will be posted here along with photos.

Afghanistan, Election 2009

July 28, 2009

Talks With Taliban After Election: Will This Work?

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 Both the commanding powers of the eight-year old War on Terror, the United States and the United Kingdom, recently hinted for talks with the Taliban insurgents after the second presidential election of the country, set for August 20.

 According to Daily Mail, “the suggestion of ‘talks with the Taliban’ came as Gordon Brown revealed the biggest offensive by UK troops in Helmand Province since the conflict began is now over. Ministers said that talking with the insurgents who have killed 191 British soldiers might be the only way to curtail the bloody war.”

 Afghan President Hamid Karzai welcomed and praised this approach, saying: “starting peace process with the Taliban will ensure peace and stability and such efforts are part of our government’s strategy,” said a statement issued from his spokesman’s office on Tuesday, July 28, 2009.

 Like the Britons, the Americans too seem in need of talks with the Taliban as their soldiers suffered record casualties in the month of July. According to Pajhwok Afghan News, while talking to Afghanistan Ulema Council (AUC) in Kabul on July 25, “US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke promised beginning peace talks with the Taliban and other opposition forces once the upcoming presidential and provincial elections are completed.”

 But the basic question is still unanswered, even not discussed: How are you going to talk with them? Have you developed any strategy for this? The insurgents have always refused to participate in talks and meetings that suggest reconciliation. Withdrawal of the international troops from Afghanistan is their first and foremost demand. For the international troops it is unlikely to accept this demand because it will be their defeat in this bloody war. It is as clear as crystal: the world’s most advanced armies and their governments just can’t afford to be defeated by a force of insurgents.

 For President Hamid Karzai, talks with the Taliban has always been a brilliant idea; but all of his negotiations offers were rejected by the Taliban leadership; the one-eyed insurgent leader has even called on the people to boycott the ‘deceptive election.’ Yet, Mr. Karzai has been using the talks offer as a slogan for his election campaign. During his last visit to Kanahar, he said that he will initiate peace talks with the Taliban if he was re-elected.  But why could not he do so during his eight years in the office? The answer is simple: because the Taliban wanted a complete withdrawal of the international troops and the international troops had an agenda of curbing the menace of terrorism.

 The idea of ‘moderate Taliban’ and reconciliation with them is also a blur perception: if someone is a moderate, they surely would not like to be a part of the ruthlessness that the insurgents have been demonstrating in different forms such as killing civilian people in suicide attacks, burning schools and hospitals and murdering aid workers, engineers, journalists, teachers and doctors. After reading this Newsweek article, one may consider even Mullah Baradar a ‘moderate,’ but, according to the article, it was he who re-organized the force in true meaning and still leads it from unknown places in Quetta.

 And then there is another question: if the international troops and the next Afghan government decide to talk with the insurgents, which group of the insurgents will they talk with? And does each of these groups has enough authority to come to the table of talks? When Pakistan balked at the recent Helmand operation, it was not just that the militants were fleeing to their land, but the real reason was Pakistan’s losing of its strategic assets.  It means that there are many external factors, such as Pakistan, who should be addressed before any talks with the Afghan forces of the insurgents. If the external factors were not addressed and the insurgents were brought to the table of talks, it will be just a waste of time and resources because these insurgents will get the huge share of the benefits of reconciliation while the external forces will still be free to recruit and train other fighters or groups of fighters who will then confront the international forces with a new strategy and different tactics of fighting to achieve their goals.

 The presidential election is now three weeks away. It is premature to say anything about the approaches of the would-be-president of Afghanistan to this issue, but after reading the views of most hopeful candidate, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, one can conclude that the talks option will not work unless the external factors are addressed. He states: “There are four major threats to securing Afghanistan’s futures. First, Al Qaeda is a renewed force moving fluidly between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Second, an expanded, well resourced, and multifaceted insurgency presents a continual threat to Afghan and international actors.” And for addressing these challenges, he writes: “To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban’s gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government.”