Afghanistan has been a real victim of world powers’ short-term strategies that are often devised against their own earlier strategies. The newest strategy that the United States is working on is to bypass the central government in Afghanistan and directly support the Pashtun tribes to fight against the Taliban. According to a New York Times report, as a first step towards this end, the U.S. is going to support the Shinwari tribe in eastern Afghanistan. ‘In exchange for their [the tribesmen’s] support, American government agreed to channel $1 million in development projects directly to the tribal leaders and bypass the local Afghan government, which is widely seen as corrupt.’

For Afghans, this ‘corrupt government’ had full support of the entire international community for last eight years. A remarkable majority of the Afghans now question that if this government was so corrupt, why the U.S. and the international community let it run during all these years. Until now, everybody spoke about democracy, human rights, civil society, stabilizing the government, and capacity building. But suddenly, the track changed and now every prime minister, every president, every ambassador, every military commander, and every civilian expert speaks about reconciliation with the Taliban, bypassing the central government, and supporting the tribes. Now they see the solution in the centuries old corrupt and outdated tribal system that will now fight against the Taliban but eventually will turn into uncontrollable militias and then? the international community will undoubtedly devise another strategy to get rid of them.

It is true that this tribal system worked 30-40 years ago, but its authority and function was undermined by a same strategy that was also devised by the U.S. and Pakistan in which a new generation of the Afghan youths was encouraged to follow the jihadi leaders, well-trained and well-paid by the U.S., instead of the tribal elders. According to another New York Times report, at that time, ‘the United States, backed by the Saudi and Pakistani governments, unleashed its own assault on Afghanistan’s tribes. American-backed Wahhabi fundamentalism created hundreds of thousands of young mujahedeen (holy warriors) to attack Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Religiously indoctrinated and flush with American cash, these young Afghan fighters viewed Muslim clerics and mujahedeen commanders – not tribal elders – as their true leaders.’

Eventually the Soviet troops withdrew, but the tribal elders and system continued to suffer as the country descended into a new era of warlordism that annihilated every value of the Afghan society. The Taliban emerged as a result of that warlordism but further expanded the fight against tribal values. More recently, hundreds of tribal elders in the tribal areas as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan were murdered in a series of target killings because they were believed to be supporters of the governments. Particularly in the tribal areas, many tribal jirgas and gatherings were targeted by suicide attacks in recent months.

The New York Times report correctly said that: ‘Some Afghans warn that the tribal system is not a panacea and fear that the United States is adopting a quick-fix approach that will not create long-term stability. They see the tribes inherently anachronistic, sexist and corrupt – a system that further undermines the already extraordinarily difficult task of creating multi-ethnic, merit-based institutions. They warn that the country would be thrown into the hands of myriad tribal militias that the central government could never control.’

So, instead of short-term and quick-fix strategies that create more problems in the long run, there should be a long-time commitment for stabilizing the government, promoting democratic values, human rights and civil society, reducing poverty, and working for capacity building in Afghanistan. That is the only way to a long-time solution in this war-torn country.

The Jan. 18 brazen attacks that challenged a huge international and Afghan military presence in a heavily fortified Kabul and turned the whole city into chaos left many question marks behind: How did the well-armed insurgent group enter a city protected by so many checkpoints? The Taliban said there were 20 attackers and confirmed that 7 of them detonated themselves or killed by the security forces which means the remaining 13 were able to get back to where they had come from, without being challenged by the security forces. According to an account (in Pashto) by the coordinator of the attacks, Khalid Mujahid (?), who claims to be present in Pashtunistan Watt from where he directed the entire episode, ‘for some time the enemies had been propagating that by building a security belt around Kabul city they had completely blocked Mujahedeen’s way but the brave Mujahedeen of the Islamic Emirate proved this as a baseless claim.’

This person claims that on the morning of the attacks he dispatched all the attackers and deployed them on many locations as preplanned, and directed the first suicide bomber to attack the palace which he did on 09:47 AM. New York Times, quoting numerous accounts from shopkeepers in front of Paroshgah building, which was burned down during the attacks, reported that ‘two men wearing the large blanket-like shawls favored by Afghan men to keep out the winter chill entered the building and went up to the fourth or fifth floor. There, they threw off their cloaks, revealing heavy weapons, and told people to get out.’

This was not Kabul’s first experience of such attacks. A similar well-coordinated attack in early February last year, in which the militants had entered the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior, created panic and badly affected the daily routines. Exactly one year later, this attack, much more sophisticated than the last one, demonstrates how the government and its intelligence apparatus and security forces are vulnerable. After this, the corruption-hit, already frustrated citizens will never feel safe and secure. And corruption seems the source which the militants used to enter the city so easily. According to a fresh U.N. report, Afghans have paid 2.5 billion US dollars in bribes over the past 12 months.

Though the casualties were low, the attacks remained effective as they came on a very important time. Earlier this month, a BBC/ABC/ARD poll said Afghans were increasingly optimistic for the future. According to the poll, 70% of the respondents said the country was heading in the right direction. The Taliban wanted to show them that the government can’t protect them, thus it will result in changing of the perceptions for future. On the other hand, just one day before the frightening attacks, Waheed Omar, spokesman to the re-elected President Karzai, announced the government was making a new reconciliation plan in which it will offer jobs, security and other financial incentives to the Taliban followers who defect. The attacks will inevitably affect this plan. Also, the government and the international community is preparing for the London conference on Afghanistan which will mainly focus on security and development and governance. The brutal attacks had a clear message to this important international conference: the sooner and the stronger you act, the better!

First of all, a warm welcome to 2010 with hopes for peace and stability! This year is crucial for Afghanistan in many ways: the insurgency has expanded its presence to nearly every corner of the country and the perpetrators have vowed to carry it on with much more force; the international community has promised a long term commitment and the United States is focusing to change the momentum of the insurgents with a troop surge and several other programs, such as the expansion of a secretive commando operation which will target ‘the most lethal insurgent groups;’ an effective reconciliation and reintegration process is recommended and voiced for from most of the influential stakeholders; and the new-in-process Afghan government is expected internationally to crackdown on the most despicable problem of the country: corruption.

The additional 30,000 American troops along with the 7000 NATO soldiers to arrive next year while President Hamid Karzai has introduced his not-so-new cabinet to the Wolesi Jirga (Parliament). On the opposite side, the insurgents killed an American soldier in the south of the country on Dec. 27 confirmed by a NATO-led ISAF press release on Dec. 28. This new death, according to AFP, doubled the US casualties in 2009.

‘The death takes this year’s international military casualties in Afghanistan to 506. Of those deaths, 310 have been Americans. That figure compares with a total of 155 Americans for 2008. The total number of foreign troops killed in Afghanistan in 2008 was 295’ (506 in 2009).

The most important point for 2010 is a hope of victory on both sides. It was not only President Obama’s Dec. 1 strategy that promised to turn the situation in favor of the international forces in next 18 months, but a NATO official even warned that a shadow Taliban government is in place if the international community failed this year. Quoted by Reuters, this senior NATO official said, ‘Time is running out. We’ve got about a year to prove that our strategy can actually work. The Taliban has shadow governors in 33 out of 34 provinces.’

He was also quoted to have said that the reason behind this was a weak government (we are witnesses of this): ‘Where the government is weak, the enemy is strong.’ ‘He also said international development ‘has not met the expectations of the people’ and that the ‘Taliban have an incredible ability to sustain themselves.’ This is an alarming situation for the Afghan government as well as the international community.

So growth in the insurgency, reconciliation with the reconcilable elements, combating corruption, and more effective efforts for capacity building on all levels are the main challenges that the Afghan government and the international community are facing together. And unfortunately, after 8 years lost, we have only one year (2010) now. By no means should we loss this chance.