Afghanistan has been a real victim of world powers’ short-term strategies that are often devised against their own earlier strategies. The newest strategy that the United States is working on is to bypass the central government in Afghanistan and directly support the Pashtun tribes to fight against the Taliban. According to a New York Times report, as a first step towards this end, the U.S. is going to support the Shinwari tribe in eastern Afghanistan. ‘In exchange for their [the tribesmen’s] support, American government agreed to channel $1 million in development projects directly to the tribal leaders and bypass the local Afghan government, which is widely seen as corrupt.’

For Afghans, this ‘corrupt government’ had full support of the entire international community for last eight years. A remarkable majority of the Afghans now question that if this government was so corrupt, why the U.S. and the international community let it run during all these years. Until now, everybody spoke about democracy, human rights, civil society, stabilizing the government, and capacity building. But suddenly, the track changed and now every prime minister, every president, every ambassador, every military commander, and every civilian expert speaks about reconciliation with the Taliban, bypassing the central government, and supporting the tribes. Now they see the solution in the centuries old corrupt and outdated tribal system that will now fight against the Taliban but eventually will turn into uncontrollable militias and then? the international community will undoubtedly devise another strategy to get rid of them.

It is true that this tribal system worked 30-40 years ago, but its authority and function was undermined by a same strategy that was also devised by the U.S. and Pakistan in which a new generation of the Afghan youths was encouraged to follow the jihadi leaders, well-trained and well-paid by the U.S., instead of the tribal elders. According to another New York Times report, at that time, ‘the United States, backed by the Saudi and Pakistani governments, unleashed its own assault on Afghanistan’s tribes. American-backed Wahhabi fundamentalism created hundreds of thousands of young mujahedeen (holy warriors) to attack Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Religiously indoctrinated and flush with American cash, these young Afghan fighters viewed Muslim clerics and mujahedeen commanders – not tribal elders – as their true leaders.’

Eventually the Soviet troops withdrew, but the tribal elders and system continued to suffer as the country descended into a new era of warlordism that annihilated every value of the Afghan society. The Taliban emerged as a result of that warlordism but further expanded the fight against tribal values. More recently, hundreds of tribal elders in the tribal areas as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan were murdered in a series of target killings because they were believed to be supporters of the governments. Particularly in the tribal areas, many tribal jirgas and gatherings were targeted by suicide attacks in recent months.

The New York Times report correctly said that: ‘Some Afghans warn that the tribal system is not a panacea and fear that the United States is adopting a quick-fix approach that will not create long-term stability. They see the tribes inherently anachronistic, sexist and corrupt – a system that further undermines the already extraordinarily difficult task of creating multi-ethnic, merit-based institutions. They warn that the country would be thrown into the hands of myriad tribal militias that the central government could never control.’

So, instead of short-term and quick-fix strategies that create more problems in the long run, there should be a long-time commitment for stabilizing the government, promoting democratic values, human rights and civil society, reducing poverty, and working for capacity building in Afghanistan. That is the only way to a long-time solution in this war-torn country.

د کابل خلک وايي “کابل دې بې زرو وي خو بې واورو نه.” دا لدې امله چې په ژمي کې د واورو نه کېدل په دوبي کې د اوبو کمبود راولي او له امله يې هېواد د وچکالۍ سره مخ کېږي. سږ کال د واورې او بارانونو د نه کېدو له امله ژمى تر پخوا کم يخ ګڼل کېده او وېره وه چې هېواد به له وچکالۍ سره مخ شي، خو پرون هغه وخت د کابل د اوسېدونکو مخونه وغوړېدل چې د لومړي ځل لپاره پرېمانه واوره راښکته شوه.
د دوو ورځو پرله پسې واورې ورېدو د کابل ښار سپين وپوښه چې له امله يې موسم هم بېرته يو څه سوړ شو. د زياتې او پرله پسې واورې ورېدو له امله په ښار او شاوخوا سيمو کې يو څه ترافيکي مشکلات او هغه خلک چې د سرپناه ځايونه نلري د ستونځو سره مخ شوي دي، په ځانګړي ډول هغه خلک چې په هلمند او نورو جنوبي ولايتونو کې د جګړو له امله بې ځايه شوي او اوس په کابل کې د ډېرو سختو مشکلاتو لاندې ژوند تېروي.

The United Nations, the United States, the Afghan government, and many other countries and entities have been very busy right now in making, or paving way for, a reconciliation plan with the Taliban that is likely to be announced at an important international forum: the London conference for Afghanistan, on Thursday, Jan. 28.
For his part, the U.N. special representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, ‘towards a first step to opening direct negotiations with the insurgent group, sought the removal of at least some senior Taliban leaders from the United Nations’ list of terrorists,’ The New York Times reported on Jan. 24. (The U.N. has now removed names of five former Taliban officials from the blacklist).
The next day, BBC reported that the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, ‘told Financial Times newspaper that there had been “enough fighting.”’ And that ‘political solution in all conflicts was “inevitable.”’
Inevitably, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan had to outline a strategy for this whole reconciliation and reintegration plan. On Jan. 17, his spokesman, Waheed Omar, told a news conference that followers of the Taliban who defect will be offered jobs and security. Later, President Karzai himself provided more explanation and said: ‘Through a national reconciliation strategy, we want to absorb the Taliban fighters who don’t have links with Al Qaeda network and other terrorist groups.’
The response from the opposite side was clear: The Taliban militants launched a brazen attack on central Kabul, very close to the Palace where President Karzai was busy in preparing his reconciliation plan. The day-long standoff came to an end after three security men and two civilians were killed and 71 more injured. The attack was not very important in terms of casualties, but had much bitter impacts in terms of creating chaos and challenging the huge presence of the international and Afghan forces in a heavily fortified central part of the city.
Contrary to that, the response from a former jihadi warlord and currently wanted terrorist leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was softer and inviting. Instead of launching an armed attack, he released a taped statement in which, according to the Wall Street Journal, he outlined a roadmap for political reconciliation. President Karzai has included one of Hekmatyar’s former party members, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, in his new cabinet which may help the two to come close.
As the past 8 years’ war proved that fighting only brings more destruction and frustration, and in the particular case of Afghanistan it only helped the insurgents to grow and expand, the entire world is now suggesting for the peace talks with the insurgents. But a huge problem still remains at place: the lack of trust among the involved parties. Though the United States, Pakistan and Iran are the main partners of the conflict, Saudi Arabia, China, India and many other countries may also have their shares. And for now, it is clear that the United States is not going to trust on Pakistan, while Pakistan will never trust on Afghanistan and India. The same is true between Iran and the United States, between Pakistan and Iran, between India and China, and the rest.
The Taliban have their own reservations about this plan. Their utmost demand is the withdrawal of the international troops, while the international community is offering reconciliation amid sending more troops. Ostensibly the strategy is aimed to weaken the Taliban by deploying the additional troops and at the same time offering them an opportunity to reconcile with the Afghan government. That may work for people who are fighting for financial incentives but not for ideologically motivated core elements and the ones that are trained and supported from outside Afghanistan. There is a strong possibility that the Taliban who defect for money may switch sides back as soon as the international forces are out of the country or they think the Taliban are stronger again.
Taking this into consideration, many Afghans believe that this plan, and even this conference, is just another talk show that will not bring any change and will have not any new impacts on their lives and the situation in general in Afghanistan. Haji Naqeebullah Muhabbat Khan, a former jihadi commander and a tribal elder in eastern Afghan province, when asked about the moot, said:
‘During the last few years, several conferences were held for development of Afghanistan and huge amounts of money were pledged but most of it went back to the pockets of foreigners.’
This is a general concern about the money that comes to Afghanistan and much of it is taken back by the people who bring it. The sub-contracting system has made the construction work very complicated and the NGO business has underlined the government bitterly. This has now resulted into uncontrollable corruption in the government as well as the private sector. For Afghans, corruption is now a problem bigger and more dangerous than the insurgency.
For better and effective results, the international community, particularly the United States, has to make a realistic and long-term strategy that can work in the regional context. For that, the Afghan government needs to be fully supported and given more authority and independence in decision-making, especially when it comes to crucial issues like reconciliation, spending the aid money, and making security plans. The international community needs to work more with the neighboring countries that are part of the problem to pressurize them to adopt a positive approach towards the solution of the conflict and stop dreaming of conquering Afghanistan after the international forces leave.

KABUL (PAN): “Is anyone in Kabul hearing booms and pop-pop of gunfire? Or is it just me?” This was one of first tweets about the January 18 multiple terrorist attacks in the heart of the central capital.

The assailants targeted the Presidential Palace, Serena Hotel, Faroshgah, Gulbahar Business Centre and many other places, fuelling panic and chaos across the city. The tweet was posted by a Kabul-based British woman, who has a twitter account http://twitter.com/girlofgordon.

Click to read full story.

The Jan. 18 brazen attacks that challenged a huge international and Afghan military presence in a heavily fortified Kabul and turned the whole city into chaos left many question marks behind: How did the well-armed insurgent group enter a city protected by so many checkpoints? The Taliban said there were 20 attackers and confirmed that 7 of them detonated themselves or killed by the security forces which means the remaining 13 were able to get back to where they had come from, without being challenged by the security forces. According to an account (in Pashto) by the coordinator of the attacks, Khalid Mujahid (?), who claims to be present in Pashtunistan Watt from where he directed the entire episode, ‘for some time the enemies had been propagating that by building a security belt around Kabul city they had completely blocked Mujahedeen’s way but the brave Mujahedeen of the Islamic Emirate proved this as a baseless claim.’

This person claims that on the morning of the attacks he dispatched all the attackers and deployed them on many locations as preplanned, and directed the first suicide bomber to attack the palace which he did on 09:47 AM. New York Times, quoting numerous accounts from shopkeepers in front of Paroshgah building, which was burned down during the attacks, reported that ‘two men wearing the large blanket-like shawls favored by Afghan men to keep out the winter chill entered the building and went up to the fourth or fifth floor. There, they threw off their cloaks, revealing heavy weapons, and told people to get out.’

This was not Kabul’s first experience of such attacks. A similar well-coordinated attack in early February last year, in which the militants had entered the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior, created panic and badly affected the daily routines. Exactly one year later, this attack, much more sophisticated than the last one, demonstrates how the government and its intelligence apparatus and security forces are vulnerable. After this, the corruption-hit, already frustrated citizens will never feel safe and secure. And corruption seems the source which the militants used to enter the city so easily. According to a fresh U.N. report, Afghans have paid 2.5 billion US dollars in bribes over the past 12 months.

Though the casualties were low, the attacks remained effective as they came on a very important time. Earlier this month, a BBC/ABC/ARD poll said Afghans were increasingly optimistic for the future. According to the poll, 70% of the respondents said the country was heading in the right direction. The Taliban wanted to show them that the government can’t protect them, thus it will result in changing of the perceptions for future. On the other hand, just one day before the frightening attacks, Waheed Omar, spokesman to the re-elected President Karzai, announced the government was making a new reconciliation plan in which it will offer jobs, security and other financial incentives to the Taliban followers who defect. The attacks will inevitably affect this plan. Also, the government and the international community is preparing for the London conference on Afghanistan which will mainly focus on security and development and governance. The brutal attacks had a clear message to this important international conference: the sooner and the stronger you act, the better!

We, Afghans, love Kabul, and we are hurt when this city is hurt. The terrorists have hurt it again. I am sick today and can’t write more. We just feel hurt!
Kabul attack in pictures.
5 dead, 38 wounded.
Updates on twitter
Video of the attack.

The other day, a former Bagram detainee told a very interesting story. We were talking about the innocent Afghans that are arrested by the international forces mistakenly or someone told on them for personal grudges, bounties etc. As majority of the prisoners arrested during the anti-terror war are from the southern and eastern Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan, they claim that their being Pashtun was a major factor that has been contributing to their atrocities during the arrest and post-arrest situations.

Then we talked about the problems of mistranslations and misinterpretations that often led several innocent people end up in Bagram or Guantanamo, the notorious detention U.S. Navel facility in Cuba.

The former Bagram detainee said that many of the detainees from the southern Afghan provinces – Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan, Helmand, and even Ghazni – had ended up in Bagram or Guantanamo just because the international forces and their American/European interpreters did not completely understand the local dialect. In many cases, a ‘ya’ is the detainee’s ticket to Bagram or Guantanamo!

The Pashto language has many dialects (click here for more details about this). Pashtuns from the Northern Pashtunkhwa (N.W.F.P.) province of Pakistan, the tribal areas, and from the eastern and central provinces in Afghanistan use the word ‘na’ for ‘no’ and ‘ho’ for ‘yes.’ But Pashtuns from Southern Pashtunkhwa (parts of Baluchistan including Quetta) province of Pakistan and from the southern provinces of Afghanistan use the word ‘ya’ for ‘no’ and ‘ho’ for ‘yes.’ Interpreters and translators who come to Afghanistan from the U.S. and Europe speak better English but don’t possess much knowledge about the local languages and the differences between the dialects. As a result, when they go to the remote areas of the country and question local people, they can’t convey the message properly to the locals and don’t understand their answers which then create problems for both the Afghans and the international forces.

Thus, when the forces raid a house in the south, and ask the men there: ‘Are you Taliban?’ Naturally, they will reply ‘ya.’ The international forces and their interpreters take this as ‘yes’ and arrest the innocent poor people. This is again repeated during the interrogation process. When the interrogators ask a detainee: ‘Do you have ties with the Taliban or insurgents?’ The detainee replies: ‘ya’. He means ‘no’ but because the interpreters don’t know this dialect difference, they take it as his confession and put him into jail. The poor people end up in Bagram or Guantanamo, subjected to torture and many years’ unlawful detention.

Also Read: Translating into Pashto: Some Common Mistakes.

Majority of these people are from the southern Helmand, Oruzgan, Kandahar, Zabul and other restive provinces where a ruthless insurgency supported by the global terrorism and a clueless international force against it have been trying to eliminate each other for past eight years without any apparent and effective success. Both sides claim to have been fighting for the peace and prosperity of the local people, but the local people don’t believe in this as they have seen nothing but their houses destroyed or bombarded, their properties looted, their people killed and the survivors displaced. They are in thousands, but we visited only few hundred in Chahar Rahi Qambar near Kabul city and found them living under more horrible conditions than before.

These people, dying for life or living with death, are victims of a global war in which the whole world is involved on one or the other side. They thought it was their fate that the war destroyed them, but they did not imagine that the world behind the war will also abandon them. Now struggling with life in these old grave-like half-mud, half-tent houses in the mid of a cold winter, their faces have been turned into living symbols of poverty, hunger, misery, various illnesses, disappointment and frustration.

‘Some of my family members died in bomb blasts and cross firing, others lost their lives in air strikes. We had no other choice but to leave the area,’ said Nur Mohammad after showing me the photos of some of the victims. He was from district Kajaki, in the most troubling Helmand province.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), ‘a November Oxfam report suggested that more than 250,000 people were internally displaced, while UNHCR reports there are 274,000 IDPs across the country.’ On Dec. 7, 2009, the IDMC reported that, Afghanistan’s internally displaced people (IDPs) face a harsh winter ahead with little humanitarian access reaching them. IDPs in informal settlements, mostly around regional towns and cities are struggling to survive with children particularly at risk or cold-related illnesses. They face a lack of food, shelter, healthcare, safe drinking water and sanitation.’

The camp we visited at Chahr Rahi Qambar is made of around 800 low-ceiling tents or mud-houses. Majority of the people we interviewed there said they had been living in the camp for a year or so. Many of them were wounded in the war, but could not afford buying medicines. Yet the main problem they constantly complained about was the lack of food and proper shelter. ‘I have nothing to feed my children today,’ cried an elderly man. Another said he could not sleep the whole night because he had nothing to keep his room warm. He was sick in the morning and visited the only clinic of the camp but got no medicine. Women and children of the camp told much more appalling stories of misery and poverty.

Though sometimes the government, some international aid agencies, and even some generous individuals distribute edibles and warm clothes among the dwellers of the camps, they never get enough food and support. In the start, when they arrived in Kabul, there was regular distribution of these things, but later pace slowed down incredibly despite the fact that majority of the refugees are old and sick men or women and young children who can’t do labor work. On Nov. 27, 2009, Al Jazeera reported:

‘Afghan refugees who fled the war-torn south have claimed they are so neglected by the government in Kabul that their children are dying from hypothermia for want of the most basic supplies.’

Following are some more reports about the displaced people across the country:

IDPs seek materials to deal with cold weather.

Internally Displaced Persons in Kabul.

Tens of thousands of people displaced by fighting and hunger.

Afghanistan Displaced from Helmand.

To give them a hope, to ease their misery, to give them a feeling that they are not forgotten, to tell them that they will be taken care of until they are able to return their villages with peace, to help and enable them to struggle with life, we have been planning to establish a systematic way to support, or at least feed, them on a regular base. Any kind of help is welcomed.

For help and donations contact: ahhairan@gmail.com Ph. 077-5075635

Bank account
Name: Abdulhadi Hairan
Account Number: 05057 0200 1872 814 USD
re: Displaced Persons
Afghanistan International Bank (AIB)
Swift Code: AFIBAFKA

It would have been undoubtedly a surprise if Major General Michael Flynn’s report, issued by a US think tank, the Center for New American Security, came out on Dec. 29. In the current circumstances, it was not a surprise; rather it provided a good explanation to the hardest blow the CIA ever had received on its face: the Dec. 30 deadly suicide attack on the Chapman Camp which left 7 senior and very experienced CIA and one GID, the Jordanian spy agency, official along with an Afghan officer.

There are different contradicting reports about the alleged bomber: first the Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility for it and said the bomber was an Afghan National Army soldier. Later the Pakistani Taliban claimed they were behind the attack and described the bomber as a local CIA informant. But then they changed their statement and said the bomber was a Jordanian double agent, Humam Khalil Muhammad.
Though the Khost attack was the deadliest for the CIA, it was not the only strike on the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan. 2009 turned out to be the most violent year of the last 8 year’s war in terms of attacks and deaths: 522 international troops were killed, according to www.icasualties.org, a website that tracks military casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq.

By now, Afghanistan has been in this war for 8 years but contrary to the people’s hopes and expectations, everything is going on the wrong way: thousands of international and Afghan forces along with thousands of intelligence personnel are fighting but the insurgency is growing; the government is in place but in a very corrupt and weak shape; thousands of people are killed every year and this number has been even increasing every month; and people no longer have hopes for a peaceful and prosperous future.

The reasons behind this mess are varying: no cooperation between the international community and the Afghan stakeholders; every country that is involved in Afghanistan has its own agendas and programs; and no clear cut international pressure on Afghanistan’s neighbor countries to stop sending weapons and fighters. And finally, which should be the most concerned, reason is this Major General Michael Flynn’s revelation in which he described the US intelligence personnel as ‘ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced… and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers.’

Result? The clueless warriors are fighting a useless war!

Read: In Afghanistan, not-so-smart intelligence